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Conversiona b s t r a c t
The spiritual but not religious (SBNR) are a growing population in secularizing societies. Yet, we know
little about the underlying psychology of this group or their belief profile. Based on an individual differ-
ence approach, we address this knowledge gap by comparing SBNR with religious and non-religious par-
ticipants. In a sample of Americans (n = 1013), we find that the SBNR differ from non-religious and
religious participants in a number of ways. SBNR participants are more likely to hold paranormal beliefs
and to have an experiential relationship to the supernatural (e.g. have mystical experiences and feelings
of universal connectedness), but are similar to religious participants in their profile of cognitive biases.
SBNR participants score higher on measures of schizotypy than the religious or non-religious. Reported
conversions from one group (religious, SBNR, or non-religious) to another since childhood corresponds
with predictable differences in cognitive biases, with dualism predicting conversion to religion and
schizotypy predicting conversion to SBNR.
 2017 Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
In many parts of the secularizing world, such as Northern Eur-
ope and theWest coast of the United States and Canada, traditional
organized religion is giving way to yoga studios, spiritual retreats,
and healing crystals. ‘‘Spirituality without religion” is resonating
with a growing populace as seen in best selling books by gurus
and writers such as Deepak Chopra, Eckhart Tolle, and Paolo
Cuelho. Despite its growing popularity, little is known about the
cognitive profile of this demographic group and the movement
away from traditional religious beliefs into this new type of spiri-
tuality. What are the distinguishing features that set this growing
group apart from traditional religion on one hand, and nonreligious
populations on the other?
The spiritual but not religious are a growing proportion of the
population in North America, Northern Europe, and elsewhere
where secularization is spreading (Bender, 2010, 2012; Fuller,
2001; Roof, 1993). According to a Newsweek Poll, 30% of Ameri-
cans identified as ‘spiritual but not religious’ in 2009, up from
24% in 2005 (Newsweek., 2009). A newspaper poll of Canadians
found that among those who claimed to be atheist and agnostics,27% still claimed to be ‘spiritual’ (Todd, 2014), highlighting the
porousness of these self-described labels. Related to this is the
growth of so-called ‘‘religious nones” or ‘‘unchurched” in North
America (Twenge, Exline, Grubbs, Sastry, & Campbell, 2015). This
group is typified by individuals who often report believing in
God but do not affiliate with any religious tradition or attend reli-
gious services (Fuller, 2001). As of 2016, 79% of people in the USA
reported believing in God (this number is 89% when ‘universal
spirit’ is included with God), but only 54% claim to be a member
of a church or other religious institution, and only 35% claim to
attend a service every week or almost every week (Gallup poll,
2016). The SBNR phenomenon is also found in many parts of Eur-
ope, where opinion polls show consistently low (and declining)
rates of religiosity, but considerable rates of alternative supernatu-
ral beliefs (Voas, 2008). This growing class of believers that do not
consider themselves affiliated with an organized religious group
has garnered much media attention and public discussion over
the last few years (e.g. BBC., 2014; Davis, 2014; de Castella,
2013; Oppenheimer, 2014). It has also attracted some sociological
attention (e.g. Bender, 2010, 2012; Fuller, 2001; Roof, 1993, 1999).
However, we know relatively little about this social movement
from within psychology and the cognitive science of religion.
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With estimates as high as 1 in 3 North Americans and Euro-
peans, the SBNR are an important demographic group in their
own right (see Bender, 2012). The SBNR represent a potentially dif-
ferent type of believer from the conventionally religious or nonre-
ligious populations that dominate research into supernatural
beliefs. Thus, more research focused on this group is important
for fully understanding the spectrum of causes and consequences
of supernatural belief.
It has previously been suggested that ‘spiritual’ refers to the
individual experience of the supernatural, while ‘religion’ repre-
sents an institutional affiliation that is less about unique individual
experiences and more about shared doctrines (see Pargament,
1999; Roof, 1993). The SBNR, with their presumed focus on the pri-
macy of individual experience, offer an opportunity to look into
forms of supernatural belief and experience that often fall under
the label of spirituality, a construct that is overlooked in the focus
on the organized religions.
In one study by Marler and Hadaway (2002), 71% of Americans
reported that the concept of spirituality to be something clearly
distinct from religiosity, and only 2.6% of participants thought
these two terms should be considered entirely overlapping con-
cepts. Other work conducted by Saucier and Skrzypińska (2006)
found evidence that identities as ‘spiritual’ and ‘religious’ have dis-
tinctive personality traits among American adults. In their study,
‘Spiritual’ was predicted by such things as openness to experience,
absorption, fantasy-proneness, dissociation, and magical or super-
stitious type beliefs, where religious belief was predicted by
authoritarianism, traditionalism and collectivism (also see
Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006).
The SBNR may represent supernatural believers under weaker
cultural constraints on what they believe than the traditionally
religious. A person can choose to believe in angels but not astrol-
ogy, or tarot cards but not aliens, and still consider herself SBNR;
whereas a Christian cannot choose to believe in God and the Holy
Spirit, but not Jesus. Although religious believers following a par-
ticular tradition often hold a variety of beliefs that are inconsistent
with theological doctrines (McCauley, 2012; Slone, 2004), they still
experience much stronger cultural norms about what they can or
should believe, and they tend to maintain these beliefs through
strong cultural learning mechanisms (Gervais, Willard,
Norenzayan, & Henrich, 2011; Willard & Cingl, in press). Greater
understanding of the SBNR may give us insights into how different
intuitions relate to different types of supernatural belief when the
cultural pressures to believe in a certain set of dogma are lessened.
1.2. Core cognitive biases underlying supernatural belief
The observation that supernatural beliefs are widespread in
human societies has led to a set of theories positing reliably devel-
oping cognitive biases supporting these beliefs. These theories
assert that supernatural beliefs are deeply intuitive to humans
(Atran, 2002; Barrett, 2004; Boyer, 2008). Intuitions towards the
supernatural are rooted in biases in cognition that make people
more likely to see certain things in the world as supernatural in
origin (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; Barrett, 2007; Bloom, 2007;
Kelemen, 2004; McCauley, 2011). These biases are rooted in, or
extensions of, Theory of Mind (ToM) (see Lindeman, Svedholm-
Häkkinen, & Lipsanen, 2015; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013). The
ability to reason about minds is crucial for the propensity to reason
about supernatural minds. There is evidence that people with
lower levels of ToM are less likely to believe in God (Banerjee &
Bloom, 2014; Caldwell-Harris, 2012; Norenzayan, Gervais, &
Trzesniewski, 2012). Related to this, it has been argued that
anthropomorphism, or the tendency to project human mentaltraits to non-human agents and objects, is a central feature of reli-
gious belief, an idea that has a long intellectual history (Barrett,
2004; Barrett, 2007; Feuerbach, 1957; Guthrie, 1993; Hume,
1779/1981). Evidence for this is mixed. Though anthropomor-
phism does predict some supernatural beliefs, such as paranormal
beliefs, it appears to be unrelated to belief in God (Willard & Cingl,
in press; Willard & Norenzayan, 2013). As well, the core intuition
underlying mind body dualism, which facilitates thoughts of minds
as being distinct from physical bodies, facilitates believing in
ghosts, gods and souls (Bloom, 2005; Bloom, 2007; Willard &
Norenzayan, 2013). We expect that these cognitive tendencies
are also relevant to understanding the supernatural beliefs wide-
spread among the SBNR.1.3. Schizotypy and supernatural belief
Another propensity that has been linked to the spiritual experi-
ences that we expect to be related to SBNRs is schizotypy (e.g.
Goulding, 2005; Hergovich, Schott, & Arendasy, 2008; Luhrmann,
2005; McCreery & Claridge, 2002; Rust, 1992; Schofield &
Claridge, 2007; Swami, Pietschnig, Stieger, & Voracek, 2010).
Schizotypy is a continuum of personality characteristics found in
non-clinical populations that, at the pathological end, can be
related to psychosis and schizophrenia (Raine, 1991). Schizotypy
consists of a set of nine possible indications that range from social
anxiety and eccentricity to magical ideation and hallucinations, all
mild enough to not constitute a clinical diagnosis of schizophrenia.
Schizotypy has been linked to non-conventional supernatural
beliefs, a finding that is reliable enough that a subscale dedicated
to it is in the Schizotypy Personality Quotient (magical thinking;
Raine, 1991), as well as a separate but related magical ideation
scale (Eckblad & Chapman, 1983).
What explains the connection between schizotypy and prone-
ness to supernatural beliefs and experiences? Two theoretical links
have been put forth in the literature: excesses in theory of mind
(Crespi & Badcock, 2008) and the prevalence of hallucination in
non-clinical populations (Luhrmann, 2005). These theories are
not mutually exclusive and may be related explanations. Schizo-
typy does seem to be related to excessive mental state projections
to all sorts of agents and non-agents (Gray, Jenkins, Heberlein, &
Wegner, 2011), but has also been related to deficits in theory of
mind (Biedermann, Frajo-Apor, & Hofer, 2012; Frith, 1999;
Harrington, Langdon, Siegert, & McClure, 2005). This relationship
appears to be a complex one. Unlike people with autism, people
with schizophrenia can easily reason about mental states and use
mental states to interpret the behaviors and motivations of others.
The recorded deficits come from the indiscriminate use of mental
states, as well as inaccurate or inappropriate mental state reason-
ing in ToM tasks (Fyfe, Williams, Mason, & Pickup, 2008).
Figuring out the exact relationship between schizotypy, super-
natural belief, and ToM is a complex and important goal, but it is
beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, we are interested in find-
ing out whether this measure has any explanatory power in differ-
entiating the SBNR from the religious and non-religious. In
addition, we wanted to see which of the several facets of schizoty-
pal thought and experience are most likely to relate to supernatu-
ral beliefs.
We expect that only certain symptoms, particularly hallucina-
tions, magical ideation, and sensing things are signs or references
specifically for oneself (positive symptoms; see Fernyhough,
Jones, Whittle, Waterhouse, & Bentall, 2008; Harrington et al.,
2005) will be related to spiritual beliefs and more typical of SNBR
participants. We similarly propose that these symptoms will be
positively related to over extensions of ToM measured by the cog-
nitive biases related to supernatural belief (anthropomorphism
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measures (mentalizing).
These symptoms are not clearly related to the sort of distress or
activity impairment associated with a disorder (unlike social anx-
iety or constrained affect). Symptoms like hallucination may be
much more common than has been previously recognized among
non-clinical populations and when given context such as religious
or spiritual experience, may be culturally meaningful and less
likely to lead to distress (Laroi et al., 2014; Luhrmann, 2005;
Luhrmann, 2011). The association between spirituality and only




















Of our participants who religious group affiliation (e.g. ‘‘Christian”), 29% claimed to
be SBNR rather than religious, and 12% claimed to be nonreligious when asked to
categorize their own beliefs. Of those who claimed no religious affiliation 91%
subsequently said they were not religious, with the remainder claiming to be SBNR.
Of the SBNR, 72% subsequently claimed to be SBNR, with the remainder claiming
they were not religious. Data collected in 2013.2. Current research
This paper explores several hypotheses about spirituality and
the SBNR in a broad and diverse sample of Americans. First we
assess a profile, in terms of cognitive biases and beliefs, for the
SBNR in comparison to religious and non-religious participants.
These latter two groups have received more attention in the liter-
ature. We expected that SBNR would score higher on measures of
cognitive biases than the non-religious, and to be similar to the
religious. This supports the idea that cognitive biases underlie
supernatural belief generally, rather than only religious belief
specifically. We include analytic thinking as an additional variable
to assess whether the relationship between cognitive biases and
supernatural belief holds above and beyond analytic tendencies,
which previously have been found to be associated with religious
belief (see Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012, Study 1; Pennycook,
Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Pennycook, Ross,
Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2016).
Based on previous theoretical and empirical work, we expected
that SBNR participants would score higher than the religious par-
ticipants on paranormal beliefs and on more experiential measures
of relating to the supernatural. This would suggest that even
though the SBNR and the religious hold different types of supernat-
ural beliefs, they share a similar tendency towards believing in the
supernatural. We additionally examined these relationships con-
trolling for cognitive biases to see if differences in cognitive biases
affected the relationship between affiliation and type of belief and
experience. We replicated these analyses using ratings of spiritual-
ity and religiosity to confirm these relationships correspond to
spiritual belief, which is the key distinguishing feature of being
SBNR rather than religious.
Next, we explored how SBNR and spirituality more specifically,
relates to schizotypy and its symptoms. We expected that only
some symptoms of schizotypy—those that include extra perceptual
phenomena such as ideas of reference, hallucinations and magical
ideation—will be positively predicted by spirituality, and as a result
be more prevalent among the SBNR. We predicted no effect for
negative symptoms such as social anxiety, constrained affect, or
having no close friends.
A final set of analyses examined patterns of conversion. We
looked at how cognitive biases and schizotypy are predicted by
self-reported changes in affiliation since childhood. This allows
us to conduct an exploratory analysis, comparing people who
remain within the same group to people who convert out of that
group into another. We expect that people lower in cognitive traits
that encourage supernatural beliefs that were raised in religious or
SBNR households to be more likely to opt out of religion (apos-
tates) and spiritual beliefs. Conversely, those high in these cogni-
tive traits should later adopt supernatural beliefs even if they
report being raised non-religiously (converts). We test this by
using different types of converts and apostates to predict ratingson the cognitive bias measures. Additionally, we look at the rela-
tionship between converts/apostates and schizotypy.3. Method
3.1. Participants
Our sample consisted of 1013 (58% female) Americans recruited
through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (for more demographic infor-
mation, see Table 1). We took several steps to ensure high data
quality following recommended guidelines for online data collec-
tion. Four test questions were placed throughout the survey, as
well as two questions near the end of the survey to detect inatten-
tion (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011). Participants who failed
to answer any of these questions correctly were removed before
data analysis (63 participants whose responses did not pass quality
check, were removed from an original sample size of 1076).3.2. Materials
The survey was conducted using the online software from sur-
veymonkey.com. All belief and demographic questions were asked
at the end of the survey, after all other measures.3.2.1. Measures
3.2.1.1. Mentalizing (EQ). We used Baron-Cohen’s (2004) Empathy
Quotient to measure mentalizing (a = 0.90). We used this scale as
an individual difference measure of self-reported theory of mind
(e.g., I often find it difficult to judge if someone is rude or polite [re-
verse scored]; I am good at predicting how someone will feel.).3.2.1.2. Dualism. Dualism is the tendency to see the mind as sepa-
rate and distinct from the body. This cognitive tendency is theo-
rized to be important for many supernatural beliefs, such as
ghosts and gods, who are essentially disembodied minds (see
Bloom, 2005). To measure this tendency we used Stanovich’s
(1989) dualism scale (a = 0.85) (e.g., The mind is not part of the
brain but it affects the brain; Mental processes are the result of
activity in my nervous system [reverse scored]).
Table 2
Multinomial regression predicting affiliation type compared to SBNR.
B(SE) Odds [95% CI Odds]
Religious
EQ 0.01 (0.01) 0.99 [0.97, 1.01]
Dualism 0.51 (0.14)* 1.67 [1.26, 2.22]
Anthro 0.03 (0.07) 0.97 [0.85, 1.11]
Analytic 0.11 (0.08) 0.89 [0.77, 1.04]
Age 0.02 (0.01)* 0.98 [0.96, 0.99]
Gender (F) 0.27 (0.19) 0.76 [0.53, 1.10]
Not Relig.
EQ 0.03 (0.01)* 0.97 [0.95, 0.99]
Dualism 0.86 (0.13)* 0.42 [0.33, 0.54]
Anthro 0.19 (0.07)* 0.83 [0.73, 0.94]
Analytic 0.06 (0.07) 1.06 [0.92, 1.22]
Age 0.04 (0.01)* 0.98 [0.95, 0.98]
Gender (F) 0.41 (0.19)y 0.66 [0.48, 0.93]
Note:
y 95% confidence interval does not cross 0.
* 99% confidence interval does not cross 0. Additional control variables included:
education and income.
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dency to over-extend human like characteristics to non-human
entities. There is a long history of relating this tendency to religious
belief (Feuerbach, 1957; Guthrie, 1993; Hume, 1981). Since we are
particularly interested in the over application of human mental
traits, we used Waytz, Cacioppo & Epley’s (2010) Individual Differ-
ences in Anthropomorphism Quotient (IDAQ; a = 0.84) (e.g., To
what extent does the ocean have consciousness? To what extent
do cows have intentions?).
3.2.1.4. Affiliation. We also asked participants to categorize them-
selves in one of three affiliations: religious, spiritual but not reli-
gious, or not religious (i.e. I consider myself to be: religious/
spiritual but not religious/not religious). We also asked how partic-
ipants were raised using this same categorization. Two additional
questions where asked participants to rate separately how reli-
gious they were, and how spiritual they were on a 10 point scale.
3.2.1.5. Supernatural belief. We measured supernatural belief in
two different ways. We measured belief in God using three ques-
tions (I believe in God, I believe in a divine being who is involved
in my life, There is no god or higher power in the universe [reverse
scored]; a = 0.93). These questions have been used previously in
Willard and Norenzayan (2013). We also looked at other types of
supernatural belief using the paranormal belief scale (Tobacyk,
2004). Before administering the scale, we removed the religiosity
subscale to make sure we were measuring something separate
from religiosity, and also removed the mystical creatures subscale,
because of its cultural specificity (a = 0.96).
3.2.1.6. Mystical experience and connectedness. Two additional indi-
vidual difference measures were included that are potentially rel-
evant to SBNRs: universal connectedness (Dar-Nimrod, Buchtel, &
Norenzayan, n.d.) (a = 0.93; e.g. ‘‘I often feel like I am at one with
the world”; ‘‘At times, I feel close to a spiritual power”) and mysti-
cal experience (Hood, 1975) (e.g. ‘‘I have had an experience which I
knew to be sacred”; ‘‘I have never had an experience in which time,
place, and distance were meaningless”[reverse scored]). We used
only half of the mystical experiences scale, using only the first
two questions from each subscale (a = 0.88). This was done to
decrease the length and repetitiveness of the scale (see Catell,
1973).
3.2.1.7. Analytic thinking. Previous research has linked analytic
thinking to religious disbelief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012, Study
1; Pennycook et al., 2012; Pennycook et al., 2016; Shenhav, Rand, &
Greene, 2012). Similarly, religious participants tend to score lower
on analytic thinking measures than the nonreligious. We wanted to
see if this relationship held true for SBNR participants, and control
for it in some of our analyses. This gives us some insight into
whether this relationship is about supernatural belief in general
or religious belief more specifically. We used the Cognitive Reflec-
tion Task which consists of three questions designed to measure
analytic cognitive tendencies; the task requires analytically over-
riding incorrect but intuitively compelling answers (Frederick,
2005).
3.2.1.8. Schizotypy. We measured schizotypy using the Schizotypal
Personality Disorder scale (SPQ; Raine, 1991). This scale provides
an over all measure of schizotypy as well as measure all of the 9
sub-characteristics of this disorder within a non-clinical popula-
tion. The nine subscales consist of: (1) ideas of reference (the sense
that people notice you, you are special or that inanimate objects
have messages for you); (2) unusual perceptions (seeing, hearing
or otherwise sensing things that are not there); (3) magical think-
ing (experiencing the supernatural, belief in the paranormal); (4)excessive social anxiety; (5) odd or eccentric behavior (other peo-
ple commenting that ones mannerisms, habits, or behavior as
strange); (6) no close friends; (7) odd speech (rambling, jumping
from one topic to another, elusiveness); (8) constrained affect
(being distant or aloof, poor none verbal communication); and
(9) suspiciousness. This allows us to test the hypothesis that SBNR
people will be high on the scales related to experience—such as
hallucinations or seeing thinks as having a special message just
for you—but not on those related to poor social abilities
(Harrington et al., 2005).4. Results
4.1. Predicting group affiliation from cognitive biases
We used a multinomial logistic regression to predict partici-
pants’ reported affiliation as religious, SBNR, and non-religious,
from ratings of religiosity and spirituality to establish the validity
of these categorizations. Age (mean centered), gender (females = 1,
males = 0), education (categorical), and income (categorical) were
included as controls in this and all subsequent models. SBNR par-
ticipants were set as the comparison group (intercept) and reli-
gious and not religious participants were compared to them.
Ratings of religiosity predicted self-categorization as religious over
SBNR (OR: 3.10, 95%CI: 2.50–3.63), and ratings of spirituality pre-
dicted self-categorization as SBNR over religious, suggesting that
high rating of spirituality are more related to being SBNR than reli-
gious (OR: 0.56, 95%CI: 0.46–0.68). Ratings on both measures neg-
atively predicted being non-religious (religious: OR: 0.67, 95%CI:
0.56–0.79; spiritual: OR: 0.40, 95%CI: 0.35–0.46).
Next, we used a multinomial logistic regression with SBNR as
the comparison category to evaluate how cognitive biases pre-
dicted group affiliation. We found that higher scores on dualism
predicted being religious over SBNR. Lower scores on dualism,
anthropomorphism, and mentalizing independently predicted
being nonreligious over SBNR (Table 2). Significance in this and
all other tables is set to a = 0.01 for significance, and marginal sig-
nificance (marked with y) for significance at a = 0.05. The associa-
tion of analytic thinking with group affiliation was in the predicted
direction but not significant, and therefore cannot account for the
effects of cognitive biases in predicting group affiliation.
Education and income were measured categorically (i.e. income
from $50,000 to $99,000) and included in all analyses as dummy
codes. To look at the effects of these we ran this analysis again with
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that a higher income significantly predicts being SBNR over reli-
gious (OR: 1.29, 95%CI: 1.11–1.50). Income was not different for
the non-religious and the SBNR (OR: 1.08, 95%CI: 0.94–1.25). There
were no significant effects of education. Betas can be interpreted as
movement from one category to another (religion OR: 0.97, 95%CI:
0.86–1.08; non-religion OR: 0.91, 95%CI: 0.81–1.01).
We used a set of regression analyses with dummy codes to
compare affiliation groups to evaluate differences in belief. SBNR
participants were set as the comparison group. All continuous
measures, including the DVs, were standardized and centered at
a mean of 0. Not surprisingly, non-religious participants were sig-
nificantly lower on all beliefs than the SBNR (Table 3). Religious
participants also were lower on all beliefs except belief in God.
Cognitive biases were significant predictors of belief, controlling
for group membership. Including these biases did not remove the
association between group and belief, suggesting that group mem-
bership and cognitive biases are independent predictors of belief.
The slight reduction in effect sizes for group affiliation may suggest
some overlap in these relationships.
Similar results were found when ratings of individual’s religios-
ity and spirituality replaced group affiliation as predictors (Table 3).
Spirituality positively predicted all belief types. Religiosity was a
significant negative predictor of all beliefs except belief in GodTable 3
Group affiliation, or religiosity and spirituality ratings (model 1) and cognitive biases (mod
SBNR in the group affiliation regressions.
Belief in God
Model 1 Model 2
b (SE) 95% CI b (SE) 95% CI
Intercept 0.40 (0.18)y [0.05, 0.75] 0.42 (0.17)y [0.08, 0.77]
Religious 0.49 (0.05)* [0.39, 0.60] 0.45 (0.05)* [0.35, 0.55]
NonRelig. 1.25 (0.05)* [0.35, 0.16] 1.14 (0.05)* [1.23, 1
Mentalizing  – 0.04 (0.02)y [0.01, 0.08]
Dualism – – 0.17 (0.02)* [0.13, 0.21]
Anthro. – – 0.02 (0.02) [0.23, 0.0
Analytic – – 0.05 (0.02)y [0.09, 0.
R2 0.62* [0.57, 0.65] 0.65* [0.60, 0.68]
Intercept 0.20 (0.17) [0.54, 0.13] 0.15 (0.17) [0.48, 0.1
Spiritual 0.44 (0.02)* [0.39, 0.49] 0.40 (0.03)* [0.35, 0.44]
Religious 0.44 (0.02)* [0.39, 0.49] 0.42 (0.02)* [0.37, 0.46]
Mentalizing – – 0.02 (0.02) [0.02, 0.0
Dualism – – 0.13 (0.02)* [0.09, 0.17]
Anthro. – – 0.01 (0.02) [0.05, 0.0
Analytic – – 0.02 (0.02) [0.06, 0.0
R2 0.67* [0.62, 0.70] 0.69* [0.64, 0.71]
Mystical experience
Intercept 0.25 (0.27) [0.78, 0.29] 0.27 (0.27) [0.79, 0.2
Religious 0.37 (0.08)* [0.53, 0.22] 0.39 (0.08)* [0.55, 0.2
Non-Relig. 0.83 (0.07)* [0.97, 0.69] 0.72 (0.07)* [0.86, 0
Mentalizing – – 0.11 (0.03)* [0.05, 0.16]
Dualism – – 0.09 (0.03)* [0.03, 0.16]
Anthro. – – 0.11 (0.03)* [0.05, 0.17]
Analytic – – 0.05 (0.03)
R2 0.14* [0.10, 0.17] 0.18* [0.13, 0.21]
Intercept 0.66 (0.26)y [1.17, 0.14] 0.65 (0.26)y [1.16, 0
Spiritual 0.59 (0.04)* [0.51, 0.66] 0.55 (0.04)* [0.47, 0.62]
Religious 0.17 (0.04)* [0.25, 0.10] 0.19 (0.04)* [0.26, 0
Mentalizing – – 0.08 (0.03)* [0.02, 0.13]
Dualism – – 0.03 (0.03) [0.03, 0.1
Anthro. – – 0.11 (0.03)* [0.05, 0.16]
Analytic – – 0.02 (0.03) [0.08, 0.0
R2 0.24* [0.18, 0.28] 0.26* [0.20, 0.30]
Note:
y 95% confidence interval does not cross 0.
* 99% confidence interval does not cross 0. Additional control variables included: agewhen ratings of spirituality are controlled for. In most cases, ana-
lytic thinking was a small predictor of all belief types except mys-
tical beliefs, and only consistent across models for paranormal
belief. The effects of cognitive biases remained the same as in the
previous analysis, although with somewhat smaller effects across
the board. This suggests that religiosity and spirituality ratings
are capturing somewhat more of the variance than religious group
affiliations.
4.2. Schizotypy
We conducted three sets of regression analyses. The first two
examined the relationship between the schizotypy subscales and
group affiliation, as well as the relationship between schizotypy
subscales and ratings of religiosity and spirituality. The third
examined the relationship between cognitive biases and the
schizotypy subscales, controlling for religiosity and spiritualty.
This latter analysis allowed us to assess whether the relationship
is primarily with spirituality or based on a relationship between
schizotypy and cognitive biases.
Schizotypy, affiliation, and belief. Participants who categorized
themselves as SBNR scored significantly higher on the SPQ scale
than either religious (b = 0.22) or non-religious participants
(b = 0.24) (Table 4). These effects were specific to only certainel 2) predicting different types of beliefs. Religious and non-religious are compared to
Paranormal
Model 1 Model 2
b (SE) 95% CI b (SE) 95% CI
0.06 (0.26) [0.58, 0.46] 0.08 (0.25) [0.57, 0.40]
0.40 (0.08)* [0.55, 0.25] 0.45 (0.07)* [0.59, 0.30]
.04] 0.83 (0.07)* [0.97, 0.70] 0.66 (0.07)* [0.79, 0.53]
– – 0.005 (0.02) [0.05, 0.06]
– – 0.14 (0.03)* [0.08, 0.19]
5] – – 0.28 (0.03)* [0.22, 0.33]
01] – – 0.10 (0.03)* [0.15, 0.04]
0.20* [0.14, 0.23] 0.31* [0.25, 0.34]
8] 0.50 (0.25) [1.00, 0.01] 0.46 (0.24) [0.94, 0.02]
0.52 (0.04)* [0.44, 0.59] 0.46 (0.04)* [0.39, 0.53]
0.11 (0.04)* [0.18, 0.03] 0.15 (0.03)* [0.22, 0.08]
5] – – 0.01 (0.03) [0.07, 0.04]
– – 0.09 (0.03)* [0.03, 0.14]
2] – – 0.27 (0.03)* [0.22, 0.15]
2] – – 0.07 (0.03)y [0.12, 0.02]
0.26* [0.21, 0.30] 0.35* [0.28, 0.38]
Connectedness
6] 0.02 (0.25) [0.47, 0.51] 0.02 (0.24) [0.50, 0.45]
4] 0.31 (0.07)* [0.45, 0.17] 0.31 (0.07)* [0.45, 0.17]
.57] 1.07 (0.06)* [1.20, 0.94] 0.97 (0.07)* [1.09, 0.84]
– – 0.17 (0.03)* [0.12, 0.23]
– – 0.04 (0.03) [0.01, 0.10]
– – 0.13 (0.03)* [0.08, 0.18]
– – 0.06 (0.03)y [0.12. 0.01]
0.29* [0.22, 0.31] 0.33* [0.27, 0.27]
.14] 0.57 (0.23)y [1.03, 0.11] 0.59 (0.23)* [1.04, 0.14]
0.68 (0.03)* [0.61, 0.74] 0.64 (0.03)* [0.59, 0.72]
.11] 0.10 (0.03)* [0.17, 0.04] 0.11 (0.03)* [0.17, 0.04]
– – 0.14 (0.03)* [0.09, 0.19]
0] – – 0.03 (0.03) [0.08, 0.02]
– – 0.12 (0.03)* [0.07, 0.17]
3] – – 0.03 (0.03) [0.08, 0.02]
0.41* [0.33, 0.45] 0.44* [0.38, 0.47]
, gender, education, and income.
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pants on ideas of reference (the sense of being noticed, of being
special, the feeling that inanimate objects have messages), social
anxiety, constrained affect, suspiciousness, and having no friends.
Non-religious participants did not differ from SBNR participants
on social anxiety, suspiciousness, and odd speech. Importantly,
SBNR participants scored higher on subscales that involved experi-
ences: ideas of reference (only then the non-religious), magical
ideation, and unusual perceptions. They also scored significantly
higher on what is classified as odd behavior, suggesting that SBNR
report more unconventional behaviors on average than the rest of
the population. These effects were stronger when ratings of spiri-
tuality and religiosity were used instead of group affiliation
(Table 4).
Schizotypy and cognitive biases. The effects of cognitive biases
were examined, controlling for ratings of religiosity and spiritual-
ity. Overall, mentalizing was a significant negative predictor of
schizotypy (b = 0.32) and anthropomorphism was a significant
positive predictor (b = 0.14). These relationships hold when the
magical ideation scale (which contains some questions about
supernatural beliefs) is removed from the scale, (Spiritual:
b = 0.16, 95% CI = 0.09 to 0.24; Religious: b = 0.13, 95%,
CI = 0.21 to 0.06; Mentalizing: b = 0.34, 95% CI = 0.40 to
0.28; Anthropomorphism: b = 0.12, 95% CI = 0.07–0.18). Dualism
was a positive predictor of extra sensory perceptions (ideas of ref-
erence, magical ideation, and unusual perception) but was not a
significant predictor of the scale over all.Table 4
Group affiliation, or religiosity and spirituality ratings, and cognitive biases and their relat
non-religious are compared to SBNR in the group affiliation regressions.
Ideas of
Ref.




































R2 0.11* 0.08* 0.14* 0.10* 0.09* 0.0
Model 2
Intercept 0.52 (0.28) 0.41 (0.29) 0.06
(0.29)
0.48 (0.28) 0.43 (0.28) 0.8
(0
Spiritual 0.22 (0.04)* 0.003
(0.04)
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R2 0.16* 0.19* 0.26* 0.17* 0.13* 0.2
Note:
y 95% confidence interval does not cross 0.
* 99% confidence interval does not cross 0. Additional control variables included: age4.3. Conversions and apostasy
We found substantial conversion and apostasy in our sample,
though consistent with a secularizing trend, our participants were
more likely to leave religion than to leave either SBNR or non-
religion for religion (Table 5). We compared converts and apostates
by interacting dummy codes for how participants were raised and
how they currently affiliate in a series of regression analyses
(Table 6). Participants who were raised non-religious and were still
non-religious as adults were used as the comparison category.
Mentalizing, dualism, anthropomorphism were the dependent
variables to see which groups differed on these traits.
Participants who had been raised religiously but became non-
religious were lower on dualism (b = 0.24) and anthropomor-
phism (b = 0.25) than those who had always been non-
religious. Participants who were raised non-religious but became
SBNR were significantly higher on schizotypy (b = 0.41). Partici-
pants who were raised non-religious but converted to religion
were higher on mentalizing (b = 0.56) and dualism (b = 0.27) than
those who had remained non-religious.
Compared with religious participants who were raised non-
religious, currently religious participants who were raised religious
scored lower on mentalizing (raised religious: b = 0.48). This
could either mean that higher mentalizing is a consequence of con-
version, or that higher levels of mentalizing spur conversion to reli-
gion more than maintenance of religion. Finally, currently SBNR
participants who were raised either SBNR or religious scoredionship with different types of schizotypy and symptoms of schizotypy. Religious and
nst.
fect
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6* 0.10* 0.22* 0.14* 0.21* [0.15, 0.23]
, gender, education and income.
Table 5
Raised and current affiliation.
Raised Now
Religious SBNR Non-Relig. Total
Religious 207 (33.80%) 188 (30.70%) 218 (35.60%) 613 (60.70%)
SBNR 13 (9.60%) 90 (66.70%) 32 (23.70%) 135 (13.40%)
Not Relig. 31 (11.80%) 68 (26.00%) 163 (62.20%) 262 (25.90%)
Total 251 (24.90%) 346 (34.30%) 413 (40.90%) 1010 (100%)
Table 6
Participants’ upbringing and current affiliation predicting mentalizing, dualism, anthropomorphism and Schizotypy. All categories are compared to those who were raised non-
religious and currently identify as non-religious.
Mentalizing Dualism Anthro. Schizotypy
b (SE) 95% CI b (SE) 95% CI b (SE) 95% CI b (SE) 95% CI
Intercept 0.09 (0.29) [0.66, 0.48] 0.69 (0.27)* [1.14, 0.06] 0.04 (0.29) [0.52, 0.61] 0.41 (0.29) [0.16, 0.97]
Raised SBNR 0.20 (0.19) [0.17, 0.57] 0.25 (0.18) [0.60, 0.11] 0.11 (0.19) [0.48, 0.26] 0.32 (0.19) [0.05, 0.69]
Raised Religious 0.01 (0.10) [0.21, 0.20] 0.24 (0.10)y [0.43, 0.04] 0.25 (0.10)y [0.45, 0.05] 0.05 (0.10) [0.25, 0.14]
Now SBNR 0.05 (0.14) [0.22, 0.33] 0.22 (0.13) [0.04, 0.48] 0.25 (0.14) [0.02, 0.53] 0.41 (0.14)* [0.13, 0.68]
Now Religious 0.56 (0.19)* [0.19, 0.94] 0.27 (0.18)* [0.31, 1.03] 0.04 (0.19) [0.34, 0.42] 0.09 (0.19) [0.46, 0.29]
Raised SBNR*Now SBNR 0.09 (0.25) [0.39, 0.56] 0.51 (0.23)y [0.05, 0.97] 0.14 (0.25) [0.35, 0.62] 0.43 (0.08) [0.91, 0.05]
Raised Rel*Now SBNR 0.20 (0.17) [0.13, 0.54] 0.48 (0.16)* [0.16, 0.80] 0.02 (0.17) [0.32, 0.62] 0.22 (0.17) [0.55, 0.12]
Raised SBNR*Now Rel 0.64 (0.37) [1.38, 0.09] 0.03 (0.35) [0.73, 0.67] 0.16 (0.38) [0.57, 0.90] 0.10 (0.37) [0.83, 0.93]
Raised Rel*Now Rel 0.48 (0.21)* [0.90, 0.06] 0.27 (0.20) [0.13, 0.67] 0.36 (0.21) [0.06, 0.78] 0.16 (0.21) [0.26, 0.58]
R2 0.09* [0.06, 0.11] 0.17* [0.12, 0.20] 0.08* [0.05, 0.10] 0.08* [0.05, 0.11]
Note:
y 95% confidence interval does not cross 0.
* 99% confidence interval does not cross 0. Additional control variables included: age, gender, education and income.
A.K. Willard, A. Norenzayan / Cognition 165 (2017) 137–146 143higher on dualism (raised SBNR: b = 0.51; raised religious: b = 0.48)
than those who were SBNR but had been raised non-religious.Table 7
Summary of findings.
Variable Finding
Cognitive biases The SBNR were higher on all cognitive biases than
the non-religious and similar to religious
participants on all cognitive biases except mind-
body dualism. Religious participants were higher in
dualism that the SBNR. This suggests that, in terms




SBNR participants scored higher than the non-
religious on all supernatural belief and experience
measures and higher than the religious on all
measures except belief in God. A continuous
measure of spirituality was also more strongly
related to all beliefs/experiences except belief in
God. Compared to the religious, the SBNR, and
spirituality more generally, is more experiential,
including greater mystical experiences and feelings
of universal connectedness
Schizotypy SBNR scored higher than both the non-religious and
the religious on the overall schizotypy measure, but
this difference was largely accounted for by the
positive subscales of unusual perceptions, ideas of
reference, and magical ideation. This suggests that
though the SBNR are more likely to report extra
sensory experiences such as hallucinations and
magical ideation, they seem to be buffered from
negative aspects related to schizotypy, such as
social anxiety and constrained affect
Conversion and
apostasy
Participants who were raised non-religious but are
now SBNR scored higher on schizotypy than those
that had stayed non-religious. Currently SBNR
participants who were raised either SBNR or
religious scored higher on dualism than those who
were SBNR but had been raised non-religious.
Participants raised non-religious but were now
religious scored higher on mentalizing and dualism.
Participants raised religious but were now non-
religious scored lower on dualism and
anthropomorphism than those who were raised
non-religious and remained non-religious5. Discussion
In this study, we compared SBNRs to religious believers and
nonbelievers in relation to cognitive biases, supernatural beliefs
and experiences, schizotypy, and patterns of conversion and apos-
tasy (see Table 7 for a summary of findings). SBNR participants dif-
fer less from religious participants than non-religious participants
in terms of the cognitive biases and beliefs. This is not surprising,
but does suggest that the ‘not religious’ part of SBNR is more to
do with their relationship towards organized religions than it does
with their intuitions about the supernatural. Dualism is the notable
exception to this; religious participants scored significantly higher
on this dimension than SBNR participants. This is consistent with
previous findings that link dualism, but not anthropomorphism,
to belief in God—a belief more strongly associated with religious
believers (Willard & Norenzayan, 2013). Non-religious partici-
pants, on the other hand, appear to be less prone to any of these
intuitions. Moreover, these differences are not accounted for by
differences in analytic thinking, which in previous research has
been shown to be related to lower religious belief (see Gervais &
Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2012; Pennycook et al.,
2016; Shenhav et al., 2012).
In terms of the content of their beliefs and experiences, SBNR
participants had lower belief in God than religious participants,
but a higher average belief in the paranormal (see Table 3). In addi-
tion, SBNR participants scored higher on both mystical experiences
and connectedness than religious participants. A critical distin-
guishing feature of SBNRs and the conventionally religious is that
the former have a more experiential relationship with the divine,
including feelings of being at one with the universe. Ratings of spir-
ituality followed the same pattern when religiosity was controlled
for. This confirms previous predictions that the experiential
dimensions might distinguish between people who consider
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itual (see Pargament, 1999; Roof, 1993).
There are two plausible explanations for why SBNR participants
report more encounters with the mystical realm and more experi-
ence of the supernatural: either participants decide to become
SBNR because of the attraction to supernatural experience, or they
have more supernatural experiences because this is emphasized in
SBNR circles. The relationship between these experiential variables
and ‘spirituality’, regardless of identification with an affiliation is
supportive of the first explanation; but more work is needed to
reach firmer conclusions.
Our finding that non-religious participants were lower on
schizotypy than the SBNR is in line with previous work on super-
natural beliefs and schizotypy. The difference between religious
and SBNR groups is more interesting. Both traditional believers
and the SBNR espouse supernatural beliefs, and therefore it is not
immediately obvious as to why the latter should be more likely
to show schizotypal tendencies then the former. Importantly, these
effects are, as predicted, driven by symptoms related to experi-
ences, such as hallucination and magical thinking. It is possible
that some conventional religion may suppress these experiences
in favor of more structured traditional beliefs guided by dogma.
Religious beliefs displacing the belief in magic is one way this
could take place. The need to explain parts of the world as inten-
tional and full of mental states is no longer necessary if one accepts
that a single, all-powerful intentional agent (God) is in control of
the whole world. Another possibility is that this relationship is
being driven by some other third variable, such as traditionalism
or conservatism. Both schizotypy and alternative religious beliefs
may be related to a personality profile that encourages deviation
from dominant cultural norms, as captured by openness to experi-
ence (Piedmont & Wilkins, 2005; Saucier & Skrzypińska, 2006).
Participants who rate themselves high on spirituality also had
higher scores on schizotypy and participants who rated themselves
high on religiosity had lower scores. The negative relationship
between schizotypy and mentalizing, and the positive one with
anthropomorphism encourages the hypothesis that this spectrum
could be associated with inaccurate application of mental state
reasoning but still involves a propensity to apply mental state rea-
soning broadly (Harrington et al., 2005).
Our final set of analyses support the general hypothesis that
patterns of apostasy and conversion are related to levels of cogni-
tive biases in predictable ways. People who were raised religious
but low in anthropomorphism and dualism were more likely to
report becoming apostates. Moreover, apostates scored lower on
these traits than those who grew up in non-religious households,
suggesting that supernatural beliefs are less intuitive to those that
abandon them than to those that were raised to be non-believers.
The opposite effect is seen for those who were raised non-
religiously but became religious. These participants score higher
in dualism and mentalizing than those who remained non-
religious. The effects are somewhat less clear for those raised SBNR,
in part because this group is small.
Currently SBNR participants who had been raised non-
religiously scored higher on schizotypy than those who remained
non-religious. Importantly, care should be taken to interpret these
findings, as these data do not speak to causal claims. Current
beliefs could be influencing cognitive biases, or current beliefs
could be influencing how participants retrospectively categorize
their upbringing. Regardless, these findings support the previous
finding in this paper: mentalizing and over mentalizing are
positively related to being a supernatural believer (either SBNR
or religious), and schizotypy is related to an increase in the
tendency to report being SBNR, but not being religious. If we
assume that cognitive biases are stable over time, these results
suggest that cognitive biases contribute to the adoption of laterbeliefs in one’s lifetime. Since these findings are correlational, how-
ever, they are consistent with a number of alternative explanations
open to exploration by future research.6. Conclusions
The spiritual but not religious are a growing demographic in
secularizing societies. In this paper we have outlined several lines
of evidence investigating the cognitive underpinnings of this phe-
nomenon. We found that in a broad and diverse sample drawn
from the American population, SBNR participants appear similar
to religious participants on cognitive tendencies known to con-
tribute to supernatural belief, and differ from the non-religious
on these same tendencies. However, SBNRs differ from the conven-
tionally religious in that they are more prone to paranormal beliefs,
are more likely to have an experiential relationship to the super-
natural, and see themselves more connected to the universe as a
whole. Though SBNR participants see themselves to be ‘non-
religious’, they endorse alternative supernatural beliefs that are
also driven by some of the same cognitive biases that underpin
more conventional religious beliefs.
The relationship between specific schizotypy subscales and
spirituality has the potential to offer some new insight into how
cognitive tendencies facilitate supernatural beliefs beyond our cur-
rent understanding. Aspects of schizotypy may help us identify
new potential pathways to supernatural belief that current theo-
ries have not yet addressed and current research has not yet
uncovered. From this current research, it appears that an increased
tendency to experience hallucinations and otherwise see the world
in terms of magical thinking, may be central to spiritual experi-
ences. Still, this evidence is in no way conclusive and is an area ripe
for exploration. An interesting opportunity for future research is
the relationship between supernatural experience and apophonia,
or the tendency to find meaning in randomness, which has been
previously been related to schizotypy (Fyfe et al., 2008).
There were some interesting demographic differences. Com-
pared to both religious and non-religious participants, the SBNR
tended to be older. The SBNR were also more likely to be female
than non-religious participants and made a higher income on aver-
age than religious participants. This tendency of the SBNR to be
older female has been noted elsewhere (Roof, 1999). The tendency
of the SBNR to earn a higher income than the religious may suggest
that one of the differences between these groups is material secu-
rity. Previous research has suggested that religiosity is a way of
coping with existential and material insecurity (see Norris &
Inglehart, 2004). Perhaps spiritual belief without the stronger insti-
tutional and community aspects of religion is a type of supernatu-
ral belief that arises in more secure environments. This possibility
is an interesting area for future research.
In conclusion, over the last several decades, a growing tide of
people in North America and other secularizing parts of the world
consider themselves to be ‘‘spiritual but not religious.” These find-
ings shed light on some of the cognitive underpinnings that sets
this group apart from traditional religious believers on one hand,
and nonbelievers on the other. Deeper understanding of SBNRs also
point to the importance of exploring this alternative group beyond
only ‘‘religious” participants in the quest to understand supernatu-
ral beliefs and experiences.7. Author note
This research was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council (SSHRC) Insight Grant (435-2014-0456) to A.N.
and the Cultural Evolution of Religion Research Consortium,
funded by a partnership grant (895-2011-1009) also from SSHRC.
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